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Abstract 
 
 
Software services are being promoted as the next big 
step forward in software engineering.. Inevitably, both 
service vendor and service client programs will 
require maintenance. We present a service 
architecture that has been motivated by a long term 
vision for software as something which is used, not 
owned. This architecture is used to show how 
evolution of software can be achieved. It uses the 
marketplace to drive the process incrementally. We 
summarise a new fault-tolerant private information 
retrieval scheme for protecting users’ privacy and 
ensuring service provision even in the presence of 
intentional/unintentional service provider faults (e.g. 
malicious failures). An implementation on a realistic 
distributed database suggests only a modest 
performance overhead.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
   Shirky [1] suggests that web services are focussed 
on application program inter-operability (to aim to 
repeat the success achieved by the web in document 
access). Thus web services do not need to be invoked 
by a browser, but by other application programs. The 
most general form involves binding complex 
programs together from component parts anywhere in 
the world. General inter-operability has been tried 
before, but with partial success, for example DCOM, 
Corba, and RMI. With these, both the client and 
server have to load the system; with web services, the 
idea is to know nothing about the “other end” other 
than what can be communicated via standard 
protocols. So WSDL allows the description of a 
service so that a call for it can be assembled and 
invoked from elsewhere. In order to communicate 
data in a system independent way, XML is used. A 
UDDI registry allows service vendors to offer 
services, and clients to locate and call them using 
WSDL descriptions published along with service 
identification information. 
   It is inevitable that service offerings will evolve over 
time, both in terms of their functionality, and also for 
non-functional properties such as security, 
performance, and cost. For example, a stock enquiry 
service would want to add new query features as new 
investment and financial instruments are introduced. 
Similarly, such services tend to operate in competitive 
marketplaces, and pricing strategies may have to 
change very rapidly.  Service users/clients will also 
need to evolve software both intrinsically and to 
exploit evolving services. In general, a service 
offering itself may use sub-services to fulfil its 
specification, so we have a natural recursive model 
which supports supply chains. 
   Our work on web services was motivated by studies 
of long term user visions for software. This led us to a 
general service architecture, guided extensively by the 
needs of evolution. We explain how evolution and 
maintenance are achieved in a market-place 
framework  (we use the term maintenance for all 
forms of post-delivery support, and evolution 
specifically for perfective changes i.e. those driven by 
changes in requirements). Evolution addresses both 
functional and non-functional attributes, and for client 
and vendor organisations, web services raise 
immediate problems of security, privacy and 
prevention of malicious attack, when services 
interoperate between autonomous organisations. Until 
these problems are addressed and solved, the use of 
web services will be severely restricted because no-
one will trust them. 
   Non-functional properties like security pose 
particular problems for evolution, since relevant 
design decisions tend to be pervasive through the 
system. We are exploring these issues by addressing 
the protection of users’ privacy (and security) while 
assuring service availability. We describe some early 
results from research that is addressing these issues.  
A novel fault-tolerant private information retrieval 
(FT-PIR) scheme is presented that protects users’ 
privacy and ensures service provision even in the 
presence of intentional and unintentional server faults 
(e.g. malicious failures). An error detection algorithm 
is introduced into this scheme to detect the corruption 
resulting from attack with a high probability, thereby 
 identifying incorrect answers. The analytical and 
experimental results show that the FT-PIR scheme 
tolerates malicious server failures effectively and 
prevents any information of users from being leaked 
to the attacker. This new scheme does not rely on any 
unproven cryptographic premise nor the availability of 
tamper-proof hardware. An implementation of the FT-
PIR Scheme on a realistic distributed database 
suggests a modest level of performance overhead. 
 
2. Evolution 
 
2.1. User requirements 
 
   It is interesting to note that most published 
definitions of web services concentrate on technical 
issues [1].  For example, web services are defined in 
[2] as self-contained self-describing modular 
applications that can be published, located and 
invoked across the web. The W3C consortium has a 
definition which is similar but includes the use of 
XML protocols [http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/]. A web 
services client will then assemble or compose an 
application from a series of web services (although 
transactional costs may force an application partially 
to be localised). In contrast, a more radical and 
demand-led view has been provided in [3] and [4].  A 
project to establish a ten year vision for software was 
undertaken, and as part of this, a workshop was held 
with colleagues from a number of cognate disciplines 
to assess their current view of software [3]. This 
enabled us firstly to identify deep seated and strategic 
dissatisfaction with current software, and then identify 
corresponding long term visions for new software to 
overcome the problems. 
 
Software vision 
 
Interaction will be through natural forms 
Software will meet necessary and 
sufficient requirements 
Software will be personalised 
Software will be self-adapting 
Software will be fine grained 
Software will operate transparently 
 
Figure 1 Vision from user rationale 
 
   Figure 1 shows the categorisation of our analysis of 
user dissatisfaction in terms of strategies to rectify 
problems. Simply continuing with the current supply-
side model of software production was seen to be a 
root cause of problems. Many problems could be 
traced to the unacceptable cost of ownership of 
software. The solution to addressing these issues was 
envisaged to be moving software from something 
which is owned, to something which is used. This is a 
common business based definition of a service [5]; it 
implies a demand-led view of software services. In 
general, users have no interest in owning software; 
they simply wish to use it to achieve the results they 
require. 
   As a pertinent example, users were very clearly 
dissatisfied with the constant upgrade and fixes for 
their software (for both commodity and bespoke 
systems). Often the change was irrelevant to their 
individual needs, suggesting that the granularity of 
change was wrong. In other words, the cost of 
upgrading had to be borne even when the changes or 
enhancements were not needed. This is a consequence 
of owning the software, and evolving the software is 
one example of the cost of ownership. Of course, the 
cost is not simply the cost of the new software; it is at 
least as much concerned with the cost of re-
installation, training, and upgrading existing code and 
databases to work with the new release. With a finer 
grained structure, there is the potential to break down 
the upgrade into smaller parts, with the possibility that 
changes that are not needed do not have to be 
purchased. This led us to the idea that cost of 
ownership of software is a major problem for 
maintenance and maintainability, and software as a 
service looked to be a promising solution. 
   With the service-based view, we see the application 
structured as a set of sub-services of more appropriate 
granularity. Instead of maintenance,  sub-services are 
replaced incrementally. Thus the latest or best version 
of a sub-service is bound in at the time it is needed; 
we do not have to wait to upgrade the whole 
application. After use, we can discard that binding, 
and form a new one next time the application is 
required. If sub-services have improved in the interim, 
we can bind to them instead. A useful analogy is with 
the development of cities; cities do not evolve 
according to some long term grand plan, but 
incrementally change, according to current needs, by 
replacement of buildings, utilities etc. 
 
2.2. Business requirements 
 
   We saw that efficient technological solutions to 
describing, finding, binding and disengaging from 
remote services were required at the point of need. 
But a higher level, a more business oriented view is 
needed if web services are to succeed.  Most software 
engineering techniques, including those of software 
maintenance and evolution, are conventional supply-
 side methods, driven by technological advance.  This 
works well for systems with rigid boundaries of 
concern such as embedded systems.  It fails for 
applications where system boundaries are not fixed 
and are subject to constant urgent change.  These 
applications are typically found in emergent 
organisations - “organisations in a state of continual 
process change, never arriving, always in transition”.   
 
 
 
Examples are e-businesses or more traditional 
companies which continually need to reinvent 
themselves to gain competitive advantage It is not 
viable to identify a closed set of requirements; these 
will be forever changing and many will be tacit. 
    Any commercial agreement between a service user 
and a service supplier requires a set of terms and 
conditions to proceed. Examples of such terms include 
costs and payment, the legal and contractual 
agreements (including how disputes are to be resolved 
and matters of redress), warranties, and security. 
Some of this may be formalised as a service level 
agreement. Simply choosing a service on its 
functional capabilities is inadequate. For example, a 
data repository service will have to provide reliable 
storage, but users will also require to know how 
secure their data is, over what period can the data be 
stored, what happens if the service supplier fails as 
well as technical matters such as transactional 
behaviour, performance and privacy. 
   The ultra-late binding model with a high trajectory 
of change needs such terms to be agreed at the point  
 
 
of need, which might require multi-party negotiation.  
Security (protection against threat) is such a key issue,  
so we decided to use this as our first exemplar of  
service-based non-functional attribute. 
 
2.3. Business  level rationale 
 
   As well as maintenance and evolution, a number of 
business imperatives favour the introduction of web 
services. In Figure 2, factors drawn from the popular 
press are summarised. These are yet mostly untested, 
and market momentum led by major vendors will be 
needed (we can compare the situation with software 
components, which offer a strong technical advantage 
yet lack many of the very powerful commercial 
 
Factor Explanation 
  
Added value services A vendor can sell a product (e.g. a camera) and then offer support 
services (e.g. printing) on a per use basis 
From capital to 
revenue 
To move software charging from a capital to a revenue base, to 
make it easier for customers to subscribe 
Updates To avoid all the problems of service packs, upgrades etc for 
maintenance changes 
Piracy To stop copying of pirated software 
New sales Planned obsolescence is a good way to keep business going. 
Anti-trust It may be a way round anti-trust legislation, by allowing certain 
external software components to be used. 
Competition On the one hand, it could open opportunities for small enterprises 
to enter a niche service market. On the other, established vendors 
may not wish them to do so 
Market structure Can be suitable for both commodity and bespoke software. Can be 
per use or long term agreement. Can be value chain. 
Functionality Sell “functionality” via the web to anyone regardless of platform, 
language etc. 
Customer loyalty Though brand names and trust – always use services by trusted 
supplier 
Integration Better integration of current systems using business process and 
modelling. 
 
Figure 2 Business drivers 
 advantages below; hence software components, while 
technically attractive, remain only a small part of the 
software market). 
 
2.4.  Maintainability 
 
   We have been working in the field of software 
maintenance for many years, and we are therefore 
familiar with the aim, for new software, of making it 
maintainable. Once delivered, it should be kept 
maintainable. Thus maintainability refers to the ease 
with which it is possible to maintain and evolve 
software. How does the service model help 
maintainability? 
   Most existing work has sought technical solutions to 
this. Some (for example by Lehman) has stressed 
process aspects. Other work has identified “ilities”, for 
example testability, comprehensibility, modularity, 
and so on. Largely, this has been unsuccessful, 
because (1) evolution is undertaken by humans, whose 
skills are a crucial factor (2) evolution causes the 
software to degrade (3) no adequate metrics currently 
exist (4) the hard changes are those of which the 
original designers cannot even conceive. A common 
rule of thumb is that maintenance changes then tend to 
be proportional to the size of the complete system, not 
the change itself. 
   In the service-based model, recall that at the point of 
need, the best/cheapest/fastest/most recent service is 
bound in and executed. This then rewards those 
services which meet the needs of the market best, and 
they will generate revenue; in contrast, those that fail 
to achieve usage will be punished by the market. It 
can be seen that this offers an extreme view of late 
binding; where services are dynamically composed at 
the instant of need and then disengaged afterwards. Of 
course this raises the question of a service request for 
which there is no offering in the marketplace. 
Although in the long term there may be technological 
help for automatic composition (e.g. using reflection), 
currently we see this as a market failure; where the 
market has been unable to provide the needs of a 
purchaser. 
   In this view, maintainability is not seen primarily as 
a technical problem, but of a marketplace solution. 
Services which adapt and change to become those that 
other users require will succeed. It may benefit service 
clients and service providers to enter longer term 
agreements, to adopt current standards and to offer 
warranties.  The ultra-late binding model does not 
imply simply an open market in which suppliers and 
purchasers meet transitorily. Of course, individual 
services are still made of software that must evolve 
and be maintained, and conventional technical 
solutions will be employed to accomplish change. 
This becomes a supply side issue for vendors, and it is 
in their interest to ensure change is achieved as 
efficiently and smoothly as possible. Some 
evolutionary changes will remain hard; in particular 
simple changes which affect design decisions right 
across the system. An example is security. 
 To summarise, our vision is that software as 
perceived by the user will have no installation, no 
upgrades, no downtime,  no unwanted features, no 
vendor lock-in, and no maintenance. 
 
3. Web services architecture 
 
In this architecture we have three major groups of 
service providers: 
 
? ? Information service providers (ISPs): those 
that provide information to other services e.g. 
catalogue and ontology services. 
? ? Contractor service providers (CSPs): those 
that have the ability to negotiate and assemble 
the necessary components/services to deliver 
a service to the end-user. 
? ? Software service providers (SSPs): those 
software vendors that provide either the 
operational software components/services 
themselves, or descriptions of the components 
required and how they should be assembled. 
 
   SSPs register services in an electronic service 
marketplace, using ISPs. A service is a named entity 
providing either (a) operational functionality, in which 
case its vendor is a Component Provider, or (b) a 
composition template, in which case its vendor is a 
Solution Provider (see detailed explanation below).   
A service consumer/client, which may be the end user 
or another service, will specify a desired service 
functionality.  A Contractor Service Provider (CSP), 
which acts as a broker to represent the client interests 
in the marketplace, will then search the marketplace 
for a suitable service through a discovery process 
involving ISPs.  Assuming such a service exists (i.e. a 
match can be made), the service interface is passed to 
the CSP, which is responsible (again on the fly) for 
satisfying the user needs with the service found. This 
will either involve interpreting this service’s 
composition template and recursively searching for 
the sub-services specified there, or using the atomic 
service that actually delivers a result.  
   The CSP/broker will discover and use the most 
appropriate sub-services that meet the composition 
criteria at the time of need. This may involve 
negotiation of non-functional attributes with candidate 
services. Note that the service composition (the design 
activity) is not undertaken by the client or user, but the 
 templates are supplied by SSPs in the marketplace. 
Service providers may themselves use sub-services, so 
the model is inherently recursive. 
   It is important to distinguish binding and service 
composition. The design of a composition is a highly 
skilled task that is not yet amenable to automation, 
and there is no attempt at on-the-fly production of 
designs in our model.  However, we can foresee the 
use of variants or design patterns in the future. We call 
this design a composition template. We can populate 
the composition template with services from the 
marketplace that will fulfill the composition. Our 
architecture offers the possibility of locating and 
binding such services as the service is executed. There 
is no concept of producing an entire executable for an 
application; instead, the application is constructed on 
the fly at the time of need from sub-services.  
   Prototype implementations are described in [7]. Our 
model has been termed a “pay per use” approach, 
because the user might be charged each time a service 
is bound as used. This is only one possibility. For 
example, a client organization may use a preferred 
supplier and pay on an agreed monthly or annual fixed 
cost. This can be much more attractive, since revenue 
costs are predictable. Also, preferred suppliers may 
have production processes that have been approved by 
the client, so issues of quality of service do not need 
to be negotiated on every use. This illustrates very 
clearly why the terms and conditions are so central to 
a web services approach [6], and why there is much to 
be done in developing web protocols such as WSDL 
to address such concerns. 
 
4. Security and web services 
 
Many security-critical information systems are now 
becoming accessible via the Internet. Examples of 
online provision include on-line census information, 
real-time stock information, and health data (e.g. see 
[4]). The information in such systems is usually stored 
in a number of backend databases. From a user’s 
viewpoint, there are at least two fundamental 
requirements: privacy protection and a desirable level 
of service availability. While attempting to meet these 
requirements, a system has to cope with software 
bugs, operator mistakes, and malicious attacks ?  the 
common causes of service interruption. 
Protecting the privacy of a user is concerned with a 
method for protecting the identity of the information 
the user is interested in (i.e. the intention) against any 
attacks occurring during communications and on the 
information system side. For example, when querying 
an online stock information system, an investor is 
usually reluctant to reveal the specific stock of interest 
to any other parties including the operators who 
manage the system. This problem is called Private 
Information Retrieval (PIR).  There are at least two 
basic requirements of such a system: high-degree 
privacy protection (particularly on the user side); and 
high availability of services. Malicious faults 
(resulting from malicious attacks), software bugs, and 
network unavailability, are common causes of 
problems. Existing approaches generally address the 
problems separately. There is little existing work that 
suggests a coherent solution to them. 
   These information sources are excellent potential 
applications for web services; instead of providing 
them simply as data sources to be queried, they can be 
provided as distributed services which can be invoked 
remotely by application programs, thereby enhancing 
their functionality and versatility.  
A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme 
addresses the problem of enabling a user to retrieve 
data from a backend database without exposing the 
user's intention to the databases. This seemed to us to 
be a good initial problem through which to consider 
non-functional negotiated attributes in service-based 
architectures with autonomous distributed databases. 
It is also of major practical importance. Applications 
include access to financial databases, design of new 
drugs by pharmaceutical companies, and storage of 
very long lived highly confidential medical data. The 
first PIR scheme was introduced by Chor et al [11] in 
1995, and since then it has become the subject of a 
significant amount of work. Existing PIR schemes and 
their variations assume that the databases always 
deliver correct answers to users' queries. There is no 
tolerance to the loss of answers, and no capability to 
detect or tolerate any incorrect answers. However, in 
reality, situations such as faulty database servers, 
malicious administrators (who may tamper with and 
maliciously interfere with data) and/or network 
partitions (resulting in some servers being unavailable 
or stopped) are very common. Although the 
replication of databases is a common way to improve 
service availability, it often suggests a high level of 
security risk for the overall system (although some 
replication proposals do provide certain level of 
protection ). Once part of a system is corrupted, an 
attacker can gain information about the user’s queries 
and can arbitrarily manipulate users’ queries and the 
answers to the queries. 
   In this paper we present a new fault model for 
databases within a web services architecture, and 
introduce a fault-tolerant (or attack-tolerant) approach 
to private information retrieval that guarantees both 
users’ privacy and service availability in the presence 
of malicious server faults. Our scheme uses replicated 
databases to achieve both fault tolerance and a 
controlled level of communication complexity. Our 
 work also demonstrates the practical feasibility of 
applying PIR to a realistic database system that 
consists of up to nine replicas, each of which keeps 
46,000 records. It provides significant experimental 
results and performance analysis by simulating a 
variety of attacks on databases and on the results 
returned to the user.    Our scheme works as follows. 
We assume that the database access to each database 
is provided through a data access service (DAS). By 
replicating databases on k separate nodes and limiting 
the communications capability of replicas, the PIR 
scheme can protect users' privacy when no more than t 
databases are in collusion.  The user attempts to 
retrieve some information from k replicated databases, 
and initiates this by issuing a request to a data access 
service. Instead of sending a query to one of the 
replicates, the DAS sends k redundant sub-queries to 
all k . These sub-queries are generated by k query 
functions based on the original query. Upon receiving 
a sub-query, a replica will construct a sub-answer 
based on a predefined answer function and send the 
answer back to the data access service. Let f be the 
maximum number of faulty replicas. We show in [12] 
that  k ?  (t + 1) + f . This condition guarantees both 
the existence of a correct result and tolerance to up to f 
fail-stop servers. To sum up, the major contributions 
are as follows:  
? ? a new system model for fault-tolerant 
distributed database systems is developed, 
with the protection of users' privacy, 
applicable to service based architectures; 
? ? a novel fault-tolerant private information 
retrieval (FT-PIR) scheme is presented, 
which guarantees both service availability 
and protects users' privacy. The failure model 
under investigation is the most disruptive 
one:  malicious failures.  
? ? the design and implementation of an FT-PIR 
enabled distributed database system is 
described. Previous PIR research has 
concentrated on theoretical feasibility by 
modelling the information stored in the 
servers as binary bit strings. Our work 
demonstrates the practical feasibility of 
applying both PIR scheme and FT-PIR 
schemes to a realistic database system and 
provides preliminary experimental results. 
The performance overhead introduced by the 
FT-PIR scheme is extremely modest in 
comparison with the PIR scheme.  
    The theoretical basis, assumptions and system 
model are given in full in [12]. Here we summarise 
the implementation and concentrate on recent results. 
5.  Implementation  
   We assume that all issues of SQL query 
interpretation are handled at the user end. The system  
comprises the following key parts. Each database 
replica has a single database, comprising (in our 
experiment) up to 46000 records of the same length. 
Each replica provides externally to its DAS a mapping 
table, which enables the record to be located by its 
index i given its key. 
 
Step 1 – accept inputs: the DAS takes three inputs 
from the user program: an intention, ? , a schema, 
denoted by s, and a security parameter b. ?  is typically 
the key of an intended record, e.g. a patient’s name, 
and s is the specific field names. As b increases, the 
security of the system improves.  
Step 2 – look up a mapping table: The data access 
service then looks up its mapping table to find the 
index i of ? . In order to provide secure and reliable 
services, a replica can also regularly publish the 
mapping table for its clients.  
Step 3 – generate a random index set: we now 
generate a random index set RIS with size b, where the 
only condition is that i must be in the set. So RIS 
consists of i and other b-1 randomly selected indices. 
Since we use randomisation here, even given the same 
i, the RIS generated each time has a high probability to 
be different. 
Step 4 – generate queries: using i and a set of 
random numbers r, a set of query functions Q1, … , Qk 
is used to generate queries, one for each replica 1..k. 
Step 5 – send requests: a requestj sent to replicaj 
consists of RIS, s, and Qj, where j = 1, … , k.  
Step 6 – generate a view: using RIS, the replicatej 
program selects records from DBj and forms a view. 
The view is generated at runtime and will be 
destroyed after the operation. Two consecutive views 
are independent of each other. A view is a two 
dimensional concept, with b as the number of records 
selected.  
Step 7, 8 – compute and send back an answer: 
based on the view and Qj, the replicaj program takes 
the selected data from executing the query, and uses 
answer function Aj to compute an answerj; answerj is 
then sent back to the client. 
Step 9, 10 – reconstruct and return a result: based 
on t+1 correct answers (answerj1, … , answerjt+1), the 
reconstruction function R reconstructs the intended 
Result?  and sends it back to the user. The  function R 
can be executed as soon as (t+1) answers are returned. 
This is defined as the meaning of correct. Each result 
reconstructed is subject to the validation of the 
verification algorithm, which is summarised very 
briefly. Although it is difficult to develop a perfect 
 verification function, we are able to design a function 
that can identify an incorrect result with a very high 
probability. Full details of Q, A and R are given in 
[12]. 
6. Results 
     
   This section describes experiments to explore the 
effectiveness and practicability of the new 
implementation in the presence of various categories 
of malicious attacks, and relationship between various 
parameters.  
   We start by describing the detailed evaluation 
criteria of the new FT-PIR implementation. The key 
independent variables are: the number of replicas k, 
the actual undetected error rate e, and the size of a 
view b.  In general, we are concerned with the 
measured overheads of the various stages within FT-
PIR. The number of replicas indicates the number of 
faults the scheme can tolerate. When malicious faults 
occur, the verification algorithm at a DAS can detect 
invalid results. Since this algorithm is probabilistic, 
there is a small probability that the reconstructed 
result is actually not a correct one, which is called an 
undetected error. The percentage of undetected errors 
in successful reconstructions is called the undetected 
error rate. 
Computation in the implementation is performed over 
a dynamic generated view rather than the entire 
database. The view size b is decided by the user and is 
independent of the actual size of the database. This 
modification has two benefits: 1) it reduces the need 
for high communication bandwidth and 2) it makes 
the security of the system adjustable. 
   Our experiments only simulate malicious attacks on 
data. Although an attacker can also target server 
programs or communication links, the effect on the 
problem we consider is the same, i.e., data is tampered 
with or observed by the attacker. The experiments 
were conducted by performing attacks on the server 
side. The attacks can occur before or after query 
processing. The first type of attack targets databases 
while the latter ones target views and answers. 
Imagine that three DAS-side threads T1, T2, and T3 
respectively communicate with three replicas. To 
simulate the attack on database, T1 sends a request to 
corrupt DB1 by randomly populating some data into 
the database before sending the request for processing 
a query. Later, replica1 delivers a wrong answer. From 
any two answers, the main program can reconstruct a 
result and thus there are three possible result 
combinations. However, only the answers from 
replica2 and replica3 can be used to get the correct 
result.  
   The DAS machine in our laboratory is a time-
sharing Sun Sparc E450 with 4 250Mhz processors 
running SunOS 5.8. Up to nine replica machines were 
used and they have the same specification as follows: 
400 MHz Pentium IIs running RedHat Linux (6.0 or 
7.2), 3Com EtherLink XL 10Mbit Ethernet NIC, 64 
Mbytes RAM, and a 4 Gigabyte hard disk. The DAS 
machine resides in the campus LAN; the replica 
machines are connected by a 10MBit/sec Ethernet 
LAN which directly connects to the campus LAN. 
The network delay, measured using the ping 
command, is always less than 10ms.  
    The software used is: Sun J2SDK 1.4.0, MySQL 
3.23, and MySQL JDBC Driver mm.mysql-2.0.4. 
Each replica hosts a MySQL database which can be 
3000 records for some experiments, and 46,000 
records for others. The use of a large database aims to 
demonstrate the scheme on practical size databases. 
The point-to-point communication channels between 
replicas and DAS are implemented using TCP/IP 
sockets. Current web service technology (such as 
websphere or .NET) has not been used in these 
experiments; our experience with them showed they 
would add a small systematic overhead to all results, 
whereas the experiments presented here show the cost 
of FT-PIR. 
   Unless otherwise specified, the standard parameter 
settings are:  e = 0.03, and b = 10. e is set to be 0.03 
because the verification algorithm is shown not to 
work properly when e is less than 0.03 in the current 
implementation [12]. b is decided mainly to save 
experiment time.  
    Although these server machines have nearly same 
specifications, they have been used for more than 3 
years. To avoid the effect of the potential inconsistent 
performance of them, we make sure that each server 
has the same probability to be faulty by corrupting its 
data in turn in separate runs. For example, in the five-
server case, any three answers can be used to 
reconstruct a result. Ten runs are carried out. In each 
run, the data of every two servers out of five will be 
corrupted.   
 
 
7. Results Analysis 
 
   The experimental results presented in this paper are 
mainly focused on the behaviour of the system in the 
presence of malicious attacks, and concentrate on the 
performance of functions Q, A and R [12]. 
 
The graphs in figures 3 and 4 investigate relationships 
between the time taken to perform reconstruction and 
the total processing time. In fault-free situations, the 
reconstruction time is always below 51% of the total 
 processing time. However, it is clearly shown that the 
time taken to perform reconstruction becomes the 
dominant factor in the total processing time in the 
faulty situations. When more than three replicas were 
used, it is observed that 47% to 97% of the total 
processing time was spent on performing 
reconstruction process.  
 
Figure 5 investigates the effectiveness of the 
verification algorithm. The dashed line is the preset 
undetected error rate used to perform the experiments. 
The solid lines are the actual undetected error rate 
observed. It is shown that using three replicas can 
deliver good actual undetected error rate since 2% to 
15% less undetected errors were observed compared 
with the preset undetected error rate.  
    It is demonstrated in Figure 6 that as the preset 
undetected error rate increases, it takes less time to 
perform reconstruction in faulty situations. 
Respectively, 28%, 29%, 74% and 80% less time are 
needed to perform reconstruction when e is changed 
from 0.1 to 0.5 for three, five, seven and nine replicas. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - the time taken to perform 
reconstruction & the total processing time in 
fault-free situations, (b=10, e=0.03, n=3000) 
vs. no.  of servers 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - the time taken to perform 
reconstruction & the total processing time in 
faulty situations (b=10, e=0.03, n=3000) vs. 
no. of servers 
 
 
 
Figure 5- preset vs. actual undetected error 
rate in faulty situations (b=10, n=3,000) 
 
 
Figure 6 – preset undetected error rate vs. the 
time taken to perform reconstruction in faulty 
situations (b=10, n=3,000) 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7 - the time taken to process queries in 
faulty situations (e=0.03, n=3,000) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - the time taken to process queries in 
fault-free situations (e=0.03, n=3,000) 
The key graphs in figure 7 and 8 show a similar 
pattern of query processing time in fault-free and 
faulty situations when the view size b changes. First, it 
is clearly that faulty status of the system does not 
affect the query processing process as b increases. On 
the other hand, both graphs show that the view size 
400 seems to be the optimal size of views as the query 
processing time increases dramatically for view size 
greater than 400.  
It is also observed that the time taken to prepare query 
increases as b increases, but the time spent on 
performing reconstruction is fairly stable since 
reconstruction is on the client side and is independent 
of size of b.  
8. Conclusion 
We have presented a service based architecture, 
motivated primarily by improving the quality of 
software to users in a demand-led, market based 
solution. This is based on ultra-late binding, when the 
software needed is assembled, bound, called and 
disengaged at the time of need. We believe that the 
full potential of web services will only be exploited 
when terms and conditions (the non-functional 
properties) can be incorporated fully into service 
models so that business drivers, as well as technical 
issues, can be addressed. A clear implication is that 
terms and conditions must also be negotiated and 
agreed at the point of need. We have identified a key 
property to be security; if this is not addressed, web 
services will be highly restricted in their application. 
Within the service model, we have explored a new 
approach to privacy in a personal information retrieval 
scenario, which is intended to fit within our late 
binding model. 
    To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first 
to consider the practical implementation issues of the 
theoretical PIR model in a real database system and 
also the first to provide a practical application of the 
FT-PIR scheme, including its application for 
malicious attack. It is also aimed at an ultra-late 
binding web service model. We have demonstrated its 
effectiveness against a variety of malicious attacks 
through significant experimental studies. It is shown 
that the implementation exhibits good performance. 
   Our work differs from recent studies in two aspects: 
1) other research considers only the problem of 
protecting servers without considering the security 
issues of the client side. Our work fills in the gap by 
considering the problem of protecting users against 
malicious servers. 2) other results were not done in the 
presence of faults (including both fail-stop and 
malicious). That may be because simulating 
(malicious) attacks is a non-trivial task. 
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